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ABSTRACT
The tendency to use technologies without fully understanding the potential
ramifications extends to all reaches of our lives. Digital forensics is not immune
from this phenomenon. This paper discusses some past scenarios in which
conclusions were drawn before all of the testing was complete. Digital forensics
tools are then discussed including tool capabilities, tool analysis, and associated
challenges. It identifies some potential issues and ramifications that may not be
given appropriate consideration by digital forensic examiners or those who rely on
these tools when weighing evidence. It concludes with some suggestions for future
research directions that could answer some important questions about using digital
forensics tools effectively.
Keywords: Digital Forensics, Cloud Forensics, Tool Validation, Digital Forensics
Tools

INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, early adopters have flocked to new technologies and ideas and
subsequently led throngs of new users to the same experiences. In the absence of a
devil’s advocate, the promises made by the technology creators are often taken at
face-value. The creators will emphasize the features and capabilities that make the
technology marketable and useful. However, they may not mention, or mention
only in passing, the problems that the technology has—if indeed they know what
these problems are. And as they rarely know all the characteristics of the
environments in which the technology will be used, the creators may not be able to
know all the problems that the technology will have during its lifetime. Thus, as
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important as questioning technology is, it is even more important to ask the right
questions.
Cigarettes – Our Past
Until the 1950s, cigarettes were generally considered benign. Doctors said they
helped soothe coughs and raw throats; movie stars and other celebrities made their
use seem attractive and sexy. Cigarette manufacturers built advertising campaigns
around these claims, and became very wealthy from the sales of tobacco products.
But evidence that smoking could cause diseases and death mounted, and in 1964,
the U.S. Surgeon-General published a report warning of dangers of smoking.
Beginning in 1966, all cigarette packs sold in the United States were required to
carry warnings about the hazards of cigarette smoking (from “may be hazardous to
your health” to “causes lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema, and may complicate
pregnancy”).
According to documents released as a result of lawsuits and other legal processes,
by the 1960s the tobacco industry had shown that cigarettes caused cancer in
animals (Glantz et al., 1998). The industry’s response was to take steps to minimize
exposure to lawsuits, in part by concealing the evidence uncovered in their
laboratories. The result of believing the claims that no evidence linked smoking to
disease and death led to a lack of understanding of the problems, and the
consequences were indeed disease and death.
Airline Scanners – Our Present
The U.S Transportation Security Agency (TSA) acquired scanning devices that use
X-rays to produce an image of a person standing in the machine. The intent was to
have devices that enabled TSA personnel to look for weapons in clothing without
patting down the passenger. The devices were controversial for a number of
reasons. The one that concerns us here is safety; there was considerable concern
that the safety of the systems had not been properly tested. Four doctors at the
University of California San Francisco, who are experts in cancer and medical
imaging (and three of whom are members of the National Academy of Sciences),
sent the Office of Science and Technology Policy a letter requesting a scientific
study of this issue. The TSA’s report, written by experts at the Johns Hopkins
Advanced Physics Laboratory, states that the devices are safe if configured and
used properly. Another part of the controversy concerned the storage of the images
for later use.
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Unfortunately, the TSA’s study is obscured in places. Specifically, there is little to
no detail available on the software test procedures, the source code analysis
procedures, and indeed on any penetration tests in which the goal of the testers is
to subvert the software to (for example) fail to provide proper interlocking, to
deliver a dangerously high dose of radiation, or to enable images to be stored or
transmitted. Further, while the TSA claimed that images could not be stored, the
same devices were used for courthouse security in Florida, and in that case images
were stored. Thus, the question that should have been asked was whether the
devices were safe and privacy-protecting as configured and used in the airports,
and how that safety and privacy- preservation was assured in that environment
(Mowery et al., 2014; Applied Physics Laboratory, 2009).
Cloud Technology – Our Future
The race to the cloud is another example of a new technology that is being widely
adopted without appropriate consideration of the associated issues. While there are
likely to be early adopters of most promising new technologies, cloud technologies
have mandated adoption based on financial considerations with little or no
associated identification of issues. As a part of The Accountable Government
Initiative, Vivek Kundra, the U.S. Chief Information Officer, identified a “Cloud
First” policy; requiring each U.S. agency to identify 3 “must move” systems within
three months and move one to the cloud within 12 months (The White House,
2010). This very short window, coupled with the lack of understanding of the
implications of using cloud technologies demonstrates a fundamental willingness
to adopt now and evaluate later.
In the years since the ubiquitous use of multi-tenancy public cloud environments
has become common there have been many cases in which the isolation between
instances has been shown to be more fragile than initially thought. Cloud
cartography and instance co-location efforts (Ristenpart, Tromer, et al., 2009) have
demonstrated the ability to map a cloud environment and place adversarial
instances in close proximity to targets. The hardware enhancements that have
driven increased processing power for many years have also been shown to also
have significant security implications. For example, timing attacks against shared
resources such as caches; Spectre, Meltdown (Graz University of Technology,
2019) and the wide range of similar attacks that have resulted from an increased
level of research into hardware vulnerabilities.
Software issues are no less prevalent in the cloud than elsewhere, but cloud
environments suffer from very real supply chain issues. Images for almost any use
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case and software product are easy to find, but significant effort is then required to
determine where the image came from, and how it was configured.
Even configuring security controls on resources has proven to be a challenge, with
S3 buckets and open databases full of PII or commercial data frequently found
exposed to the Internet with no access controls. While it is easy to place the blame
for such incidents on the data owners and administrators, cloud providers’ simple
“click to deploy” interfaces make it quick and easy to create working instances,
while the more nuanced security configuration is left as an option that can be easily
overlooked or misconfigured (particularly when dealing with large or dynamic
environments).
This tendency to use technologies without fully understanding the ramifications
extends to all reaches of our lives. Digital forensics is not immune from this
phenomenon. The motivations may be different as the objectives are more likely
motivated by simplifying the process for the forensics examiner rather than
lowering costs. The following sections discuss some digital forensic tools in this
light and identify some potential issues and ramifications that may not be given
appropriate consideration by digital forensic examiners or those who rely on these
tools when weighing evidence.

DIGITAL FORENSICS TOOLS
While digital forensics used to be applied primarily to computer crime, the
increasing predominance of electronic devices in all areas of our lives has
contributed to a world where crimes that could not be informed by digital
components are rare indeed. A mobile phone in the pocket of a burglar, the gps in
the car used to escape from the crime scene, the red-light camera that snapped photo
of the getaway all have the potential to provide valuable evidence to exonerate or
help convict suspects.
Tools Analysis
The need to validate tools for the end user has been discussed in the academic and
popular press for many years. NIST announced the Computer Forensics Tool
Testing Program (CFTT), which is a very positive step in the validation of forensics
tools. The effort involves major law enforcement players in the digital forensics
realm and includes the capability for you to test your own tool using their
methodology. The overall objective is to “provide forensics tool testing reports to
the public.” The reports are designed to provide test results with the information
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needed to allow 1) developers to improve tools, 2) users to make informed choices,
and 3) the legal community and others to understand the tools’ capabilities
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2019).
The site currently contains reports in the following digital forensics areas:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Deleted File Recovery and Active File Listing (last update 7/14)
Digital Data Acquisition (last update 7/14)
Disk Imaging (last update 10/16)
Forensics Media Preparation (Last update 12/11)
Graphic File Carving (last update 7/14)
Hardware Write Block (9/09)
Mobile Device Acquisition (12/17)
Software Write Block (1/08)
Video File Carving (10/14)

The software industry tends to use a release-and-patch approach for software. This
includes tools used in the digital forensics arena. As can be seen in the listing of
forensics areas for which tool validation reports are published, the lag time in
updating the tests is significant. This lack of currency greatly decreases the benefits
of the reports to digital forensic examiners.
In addition to the lack of currency, there is also a limit to the breadth of the tools
that have been tested. The focus for the majority of the tools in the reports had been
file systems forensics. File systems forensics represent an important subset of the
critical digital forensic information that is needed for digital forensics analysts to
understand. Missing from the categories are memory forensics, network forensics,
cloud forensics, and the plethora of device forensics that are not encompassed in
the mobile device family.
Perhaps the reporting mechanism, which is a very important step in advancing the
state of validation of digital forensics tools, could be partially addressed by the
formalization of a process for continuous evolution of the site contents if it is to be
the definitive resource in this area. A plan for maintaining currency would include
retesting of tools as new updates are released and method for evolution of the
categories as the field of digital forensics continues to advance.
The following section provides some examples of specific digital forensics tools
and some associated issues that might affect the appropriateness of their application
to digital forensics cases.
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Graphic File Carving Tools - Encase and FTK
The Encase 6.18.0.59 graphic file carving tool is one of the tools tested in 2014
with a report available on the CFTT site (Department of Homeland Security, 2014).
The test was run with 40 graphic files. While there were only 40 files, 62 were
carved, with 33 of the carved files being viewable (3 only partially). The rest of the
files were either not-viewable gif files (4) or 25 false positives.
The FTK 4.1 graphic file carving tool was also tested in 2014 (Department of
Homeland Security, 2014). The same 40 files were used and with this tool only 39
were carved. Of the files carved, 33 were viewable, 3 were partially viewable, and
3 were not viewable. The files not viewable were again gif files. There is no
indication that they are the same 3 files in both tools.
What is it about the gif files that made them none viewable? Is it something that a
criminal or state actor could investigate, discover and then include that attribute in
their images? It would be beneficial to see the evolution of the tool and the
associated tests in one chain to demonstrate the responsiveness of the organization
in responding to issues identified in the validation testing process. Further, a
subsequent validation of a more recent release may have concluded that this is no
longer an issue.
NIST Tool Catalog
NIST hosts a list of tools that developers can self-register (“Computer Forensics
Tools & Techniques Catalog - Home,” 2019). Many tools are listed without having
a report of the tool being tested. In fact, of the 243 tools listed on the site, only 56
of them state they have a report. Of those, only 34 have working links to actual
reports. Of the 34 reports, many of those date back to 2012 and earlier. Most of the
tools have gone through at least one revision since their report date.
Tools listed on the NIST Tools Catalog site have an implied validation. It is likely
that people seeing a tool listed on the site will assume that the tool is appropriate
for use in a digital forensics investigation. And perhaps it is, but without proper
testing and validation, one cannot be sure and the time to find out should not be in
the middle of a criminal investigation.
Another concern is how tools are registered with the site. A form is filled out by a
tool developer and submitted. A person at NIST reviews the submission and then
determines if it should be posted. The rubric through which this decision is made is
not clear. Is it possible that a sophisticated hacker or state sponsored group could
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create a set of infected tools and have them posted to the site? This possibility
motivates additional testing of the tools beyond operational validation.
As discussed above, there have been some steps taken towards improving the
availability of information about tools and some vendors have allowed their tools
to be tested through the CFTT process, there remain a plethora of tools that remain
untested. Of primary concern is the prevalence of the use of tools in situations that
affect legal outcomes and human lives without the tools being validated with
scientific rigor.

CHALLENGES
In addition to specific issues related to validation of tools, there are additional
challenges that digital forensics tools share with most other sectors in the software
markets. Two of these issues that are particularly impactful are the uncontrolled
proliferation of new tools and the lack of education in proper and appropriate use
of the tools.
Tools Proliferation
As new technology emerges, so do the new tools. Long gone are the simple days
where looking at hard drives alone was sufficient. The taxonomy of forensics tools
has grown to include items such as GPS forensics, drone forensics and VoIP
forensics. There are at present 32 different categories of tools. With new tools
coming out and at such a pace, there is hardly time for the tools to mature and there
is little time or manpower available to test all of the new tools. For many
investigators low cost, easy access, and easy to use are often the major factors in
tool selection. Yet these are not necessarily the measures that should be used in the
determination of the tool to use.
Education about Tools
Many tools are released to the public and then used but without formal training. All
tools have their quirks and use cases. Sometimes they are obvious but other times
not. In the preceding examples with Encase and FTK testing, why would 3 gif files
not show up when a graphic file carver is run? The answer to this question may
have important bearing on a digital forensics case and could potentially change the
classification of the crime when the number of images on a computer is a
determining factor.
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FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
While the NIST plan provides a solid foundation to improve the state of digital
forensics tools, there doesn’t appear to be a structured approach for continuous
process improvement from a presumably unbiased perspective. While the test
reports do bring issues to light, the lack of a structured process diminishes the value
of the collection as a current method for validating tools.
Clearly, there is a need for greater tool testing and reporting. To impart this need to
future forensic investigators, tool testing should become part of the forensic
curriculum. Available on the NIST the CFTT Federated Testing Forensic Tool
Environment is a live Linux CD iso file that can be used for testing disk imaging
tools, hardware write block tools and mobile device tools (NIST Tool Catalog).
Introducing this a college forensic curriculum can teach students how to test tools,
to learn about the functions and limitations of a tool, and most importantly, show
them the importance of testing a tool before using it for investigations.
Forensic analysts need to become familiar with the reports that do exist and be
aware of the limitations and anomalies that can arise from the use of a tool. Because
a tool is listed on the NIST Catalog site does not mean a thorough examination of
the tool was done or that a report on it exists. Sophisticated adversaries may do their
own testing to find the limitations of a tool and exploit the weakness of the tool to
prevent information from being discovered by the tool.
Defense attorneys may seize upon this issue of tools used that lack the proper testing
and reporting. A good lawyer may call tools used to gather evidence into question.
If the tool has significant problems when used in certain operating systems or
settings, this may help them reach their goal of establishing reasonable doubt.
Finally, this reinforces the need for using multiple tools when analyzing evidence.
While it may add time to an investigation, one tool can mitigate the issues of
another. If one tool fails to find a particular gif file, perhaps another will.
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